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Executive Summary 
Since its appearance on the educational landscape, school choice has 
engendered considerable controversy. Those controversies are captured in 
two forms of “law”—legislation and litigation. Government legislation at 
all levels codifies the results of political struggles around school choice 
and defines choices available to parents. Those unhappy with the results 
have brought litigation to determine whether the policies are consistent 
with constitutional provisions and other existing laws. This policy brief 
examines the relationships between various forms of school choice and the 
legal authority that both binds and bounds them. As the discussion will 
show, both the development of and legal challenges to school choice in its 
various forms can be traced to a tension between the legal principle that 
parents should be able to direct the upbringing of their children and the 
legal principle of parens patriae (the government is the ultimate 
guardian), which forms the foundation for compulsory education in the 
United States. As such, school choice legislation and litigation go to the 
very heart of public education and the societal values it reflects. 
 
In light of recent legal events, the following recommendations are offered 
to officials to guide their work as they consider the implications of the 
choice initiatives established, the purposes they intend to serve, and the 
civic principles embedded by their adoption: 
 
• Examine parental choice programs to ensure that they espouse the 
values of the communities they serve in a manner consistent with 
federal and state constitutional guarantees. 
• Ensure that parental choice programs serve educational opportunity and 
equity rather than undercut them. 
• Consider carefully the implications of any choice program, not only for 
those who “choose” but also for those who do not. 
• Engage the research community not only to inform the debate about 
effectiveness, but also to track the implications of the various choice 
programs undertaken. 
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Introduction 
Since its appearance on the educational landscape, school choice 
has engendered considerable controversy. Those controversies are 
captured in two forms of “law”—legislation and litigation. Legislation at 
all governmental levels codifies the results of political struggles around 
school choice and defines the actual choices available to parents. 
Numerous forms of school choice have been created through this political 
process, including magnet schools, interdistrict choice, intradistrict choice, 
charter schools, home schooling, and voucher programs. These choice 
programs vary with respect to the children eligible to participate, the 
universe of schools from which a parent may choose, and the funding that 
may support the choice. Likewise, litigation has been brought to determine 
whether those legislative enactments are consistent with constitutional 
provisions and other existing laws. When courts have determined that 
school choice exceeds legal boundaries, programs have been struck down. 
Legislation and litigation, therefore, have shaped school choice in direct 
and significant ways. This brief examines the relationships between 
various forms of school choice and the legal authority that both binds and 
bounds them.1 As the discussion will show, both the creations of and legal 
challenges to school choice can be traced to a tension between the legal 
principle that parents should be able to direct the upbringing of their 
children and the legal principle of parens patriae (the government is the 
ultimate guardian), which forms the foundation for compulsory education 
in the United States.  
 
Parens Patriae and the History of School Choice Legislation 
Parens Patriae 
In order to understand how legislation and litigation shape school 
choice, it is first necessary to understand how various school choice 
options came to be. Writ large, school choice—the concept that parents 
decide where and how their children will be educated—has always 
existed. Initially, of course, education existed only for the wealthy, and 
any education received was closely aligned with the occupation and status 
of the parents. It was not until the 19th century that formal public 
education, supported by a governmental body, began to be offered.2  Not 
long after, the first compulsory education laws were adopted, first in 
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Massachusetts in 1853 and by the majority of states by the end of century.3  
Like many laws designed to promote the “general welfare,” compulsory 
education provisions stem from the legal principle known as parens 
patriae.  
Parens patriae is Latin for “father of his country” and refers to the 
common law doctrine that the state serves as parent to us all.4   In other 
words, the state has interests independent from its citizens that may even 
outweigh the individual interests of those citizens. As applied to schools, it 
refers to the state’s interest in ensuring an educated citizenry and in 
defining what it means to be educated.5  Thus, parens patriae forms the 
legal foundation for compulsory school attendance laws. Even if a parent 
believes that education serves no purpose, that parent may not elect to 
withhold educational opportunities from a son or daughter. The state may 
legitimately and lawfully compel all parents to educate their children and 
penalize any parent who refuses.  
But the doctrine of parens patriae is not without limits. Several 
lawsuits have been filed over the years asserting that the state has 
overstepped its boundaries with respect to compulsory schooling. The 
Supreme Court’s 1925 decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters best 
illustrates the balance of interests that must be struck.6  Private school 
operators challenged an Oregon statute that required children to attend 
public schools in order to satisfy compulsory attendance requirements. 
The Court agreed with the schools that the law unjustifiably 
 
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to 
direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control. . . The fundamental theory of liberty upon which 
all governments in the Union repose excludes any general 
power of the state to standardize its children by forcing 
them to accept instruction from public teachers only.7  
 
Accordingly, states have the authority to compel children to be 
educated and to define reasonable minimum expectations for that 
education, but may not require public education. As such, it can be argued 
that Pierce was the first important school choice decision. 
 
Modern School Choice Develops 
For many years, then, school choice was limited to a selection 
between public and private schools for those parents with the means to pay 
for private education. Children enrolled in whatever public school served 
their neighborhood or community, and place of residence dictated the 
public school available to parents.8   
Those opposed to desegregation in the aftermath of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brown v. the Board of Education capitalized on the 
distinction between universal public school access and controlled private 
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school access as a means to subvert the Court’s directive to dismantle 
segregation with “deliberate speed.”9 For example, officials in Prince 
Edward County, Virginia, refused to desegregate, choosing instead to 
close all public schools and provide vouchers to private schools, which 
they knew to be limited and segregated.  These so-called “choice 
academies” operated in several southern states, including Alabama, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia.10 The Supreme Court struck 
down the Prince Edward County plan as unconstitutional in 1964 in 
Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County.11 Similarly, five 
years later, the Court struck down a “freedom of choice” plan that allowed 
students to select which public school they wished to attend in the 
previously segregated New Kent County, Virginia, Schools (Green v. 
County School Board).12 In Green, the Court held that public officials had 
an obligation to take affirmative steps to desegregate public schools and 
that relying on parental choice, given the history of de jure segregation, 
was an insufficient response to the constitutional injury declared by 
Brown.  Accordingly, racial politics and school choice became 
intertwined.13  
Also during the 1950s and 1960s, the primary market-based 
arguments for school choice, the foundational policy arguments, also 
evolved.  Economist Milton Friedman most influenced ideas about school 
choice.14  In his seminal 1962 work, Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman 
argued that all parents, rich and poor alike, should have available to them 
the option to enroll their child in any school.15  To support those 
selections, he proposed that parents be provided a “voucher” that could be 
redeemed at any school, thus creating competition between schools, 
which, he maintained, would spur excellence in an effort to retain 
students. 
Friedman’s idea, however, was not put into practice until the 
1970s, and then, only on a modest scale. The application of school choice 
that evolved during that decade continued the earlier linkage of race and 
choice, but with an opposite goal. In contrast to earlier efforts to harness 
parental choice to retain segregation, during this period some school 
districts began employing choice options as a means to desegregate 
schools.16 Often as part of court desegregation orders, school districts 
created magnet schools, each with a special curricular focus, as a way to 
attract parents to enroll their children in schools they would not ordinarily 
attend in order to encourage voluntary integration.17  Thus, parents could 
choose to have a child attend a neighborhood school or a magnet school 
with some special attraction.  However, although choices were available, 
Friedman’s concept of competition among schools was largely absent. 
Also in the early to mid-1970s, the federal government initiated an 
early experiment in school choice in Alum Rock, California, to test its 
effect on student achievement and other things.18  Sponsored by the Office 
of Equal Opportunity, the program allowed parents to choose among 
public schools.  Officials originally intended the experiment to include 
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private schools, but that aspect of the study was never implemented.  The 
results proved not to be instructive, however, due to what study authors 
concluded were a number of design flaws.  Still, the concept of studying a 
link between achievement and parental choice would foreshadow choice 
programs that developed later. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, school districts and states also 
began to develop intradistrict and interdistrict choice programs. Intra-
district choice programs allow students to enroll in any school in the 
district or a portion of the district without regard to residence. Frequently, 
urban districts divide their schools into attendance zones.  Students are 
guaranteed enrollment within their zone and at a school in which a sibling 
is enrolled.  Open seats are then filled by those residing outside the zone, 
although there may be some limits on publicly provided transportation. 
These programs have generally been initiated by local officials, although 
states may support efforts through funding. Perhaps one of the earliest and 
best known examples of this type of choice began operation in East 
Harlem, New York, in Manhattan’s District No. 4.19 
Interdistrict programs allow students to enroll in a school in 
another school district. There are generally two types of such programs.  
The first, city-suburban transfer programs, were typically initiated by state 
legislatures as a means of voluntary integration.  They fund transfers 
between neighboring districts as means to reduce racial isolation in urban 
areas.20 The second type of interdistrict choice program allows open 
enrollment in any public district in the state. As a rule, these public school 
choice programs grant enrollment priority based on residence, with outside 
choosers competing for remaining available slots. Currently, 
approximately 41 states have adopted some sort of interdistrict open 
enrollment policy.21  
Statewide open enrollment plans illustrate a shift in the rationale 
for choice programs. These programs and other school choice plans 
evolved in the 1980s and 1990s as a means to advance general school 
reform. It was at this time that political bodies began to embrace 
Friedman’s idea of an educational marketplace. Partly in response to the 
1983 National Commission on Excellence in Education report entitled A 
Nation at Risk, which argued that public schools were generally failing in 
their mission, policymakers at all levels began to look more favorably at 
choice programs, including voucher programs and charter school 
programs, on the theory that competition would motivate school 
authorities to achieve excellence. Perhaps the most vocal champions of 
this argument were John Chubb and Terry Moe of the Brookings 
Institution.  Chubb and Moe argued that school choice had the capacity to 
radically reform publicly funded education.  As they explained: 
 
Choice is a self-contained reform with its own rationale and 
justification.  It has the capacity all by itself to bring about 
the kind of transformation that, for years, reforms have 
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been seeking to engineer in myriad other ways. . . .The 
whole point of a thoroughgoing system of choice is to free 
schools from  . . . disabling constraints by sweeping away 
the old institutions and replacing them with new ones.  
Taken seriously, choice is not a system-preserving reform.  
It is a revolutionary reform that introduces a new system of 
public education.22 
 
The most complete expression of this idea was the enactment of 
voucher programs in Milwaukee and Cleveland, created as a means to 
allow parents to exit these troubled urban systems by providing eligible 
low-income students public funds to pay tuition at participating private 
schools in each city.23  
Also during this period, Minnesota introduced public charter 
schools, which are relieved from state regulation in exchange for being 
bound by a performance contract. As will be discussed more fully below, 
40 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have now enacted 
public charter school legislation.24  
Finally, technological advances allowed schools, districts and 
states to create virtual educational alternatives in the form of cyber 
schools. At least fifteen state educational agencies now operate some form 
of virtual school,25 while more than 200 charter schools offer the same 
option to parents and students, though not all deliver instruction 
exclusively via the Internet.26 
As these publicly funded school choice initiatives were 
developing, states also relaxed compulsory education statutes to allow 
parents to educate their children at home. Prior to the 1980s only two 
states, Nevada and Utah, allowed parents to meet compulsory attendance 
laws by home schooling. By the middle of the 1990s, home schooling was 
allowed in all fifty states, though states vary with regard to how much 
regulation governs home schools.27 
While all of these options evolved from state and local policies, the 
federal government, too, played a role. Congress used its power of the 
purse to enact a number of statutes that supported the various efforts 
through funding, often in the form of grants. For example, the Magnet 
School Assistance Program was enacted in 1984 and provided funds to 
local school districts employing magnet schools in their integration 
efforts.28  Likewise, the Charter School Expansion Act of 1998 created 
grants to support the expansion of charter schools in those states 
permitting them.29  Versions of both these laws exist today as part of the 
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB).30 In addition, NCLB employs 
school choice as a penalty for schools that fail to demonstrate adequate 
yearly progress (AYP) toward universal student proficiency on state 
assessments of reading, math, and science achievement. NCLB’s choice 
provisions will be described in greater detail below and, as will be shown, 
mark a dramatic shift in federal support for choice. 
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As this discussion illustrates, legislation has evolved at all levels to 
govern an array of school choice options. As each option developed, 
parents were provided with another means of satisfying compulsory 
school attendance provisions. Table 1 lists each type of school choice and 
the level of legislation or policy making that controls the implementation 
of the school choice options available to parents. 
 
Table 1: Legislation that Defines and Governs Forms of School Choice 
 Federal  State Local 
Charter Schools Federal funds to 
support 
development 
State laws define Local school 
districts serve as 
authorizers and 
operators 
Cyber Schools  State laws define Local board 
decision 
Home schooling  State law defines Local policies may 
allow partial 
enrollment & 
participation in 
activities 
Interdistrict Choice 
- City/Suburban    
  Plans 
NCLB encourages 
for schools that fail 
to make AYP 
State laws define Local policy 
directs/elects 
participation 
- Statewide Open    
  Enrollment 
NCLB encourages 
for schools that fail 
to make AYP 
State laws define Local policy 
directs/elects 
participation 
Intradistrict Choice 
  - Magnet Schools Federal law 
encourages 
through funding 
State law may 
encourage through 
funding 
Local board 
decision 
- Intradistrict   
  transfer 
NCLB requires for 
some students 
 Local board 
decision 
Vouchers   State laws define  
 
Litigation Shapes School Choice 
In the same way that legislation shapes the school choices 
available to parents, so too has litigation fashioned the programs currently 
operating. As with any controversial policy, opponents have sometimes 
used the court system to mount formal legal challenges to school choice. 
In some instances, litigants alleged that policy-makers had exceeded 
boundaries set either by federal or state constitutional guarantees, or both. 
Others mounted challenges asserting that a program was operating in ways 
that violated statutory requirements. 
            How Legislation and Litigation Shape School Choice    
 8 of 27 
The scope of this brief does not permit an exhaustive review of 
school choice litigation; however, the majority of legal issues raised by 
such cases fall into six categories, each of which is briefly discussed 
below: 
 
1. Whether the school choice program violates the establishment 
or free exercise of religion clauses, or both, in state and federal 
constitutions.  
2. Whether the operation of school choice programs results in 
discrimination on the basis of race. 
3. Whether the regulation of choices impinges on parents’ rights 
without adequate due process in violation of state and federal 
constitutions. 
4. Whether the school choice program is consistent with states’ 
constitutional obligations to offer a public education under 
each state constitution.  
5. Whether school choice programs must provide access and 
programming to allow children with disabilities to participate 
in the program.  
6. Whether the choice program operates in a manner consistent 
with statutory requirements. 
 
 
Religion Clause Cases 
The First Amendment contains two religion clauses.  The first, the 
Establishment Clause, prohibits government officials from adopting any 
policy or practice “respecting an establishment of religion.” 31  The second 
clause of the same amendment prohibits government officials from 
prohibiting the free exercise of religion.32  School choice has sparked 
litigation under both clauses.  Establishment Clause cases center on 
whether a particular choice results in state support or sponsorship of 
religion or religious teaching.  Free Exercise cases examine whether state 
rules regarding various choice options result in an impermissible 
infringement on parents’ or students’ exercise of religious beliefs. 
Arguably the legal issue receiving the most public press centers on 
the whether states can include private religious schools in any voucher 
program. The Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Washington, D.C., programs all 
allow private religious schools to participate in their programs, providing 
public funding for both religious and secular education.33 Challengers to 
both the Milwaukee and Cleveland programs alleged that allowing public 
funds to purchase private religious education violated the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.34  The 
question was resolved by a sharply divided U.S. Supreme Court in Zelman 
v. Simmons-Harris in 2002, when the Court upheld the Cleveland 
program.35  The five-member majority held that the program served a 
            How Legislation and Litigation Shape School Choice    
 9 of 27 
legitimate secular purpose of providing low-income families a means to 
purchase educational opportunities for their children. In addition, the 
Court held that as long as parents (the recipients of the aid) were not held 
to religious criteria for participation and had available to them a “genuine 
choice” from among a variety of secular and sectarian schools, the 
program was not unconstitutional.  A key factor in the ruling was the fact 
that the decision to enroll in a religious school was made by private 
individuals, not the state. 
While Zelman settled the matter under the federal constitution with 
respect to similarly designed programs, some have questioned whether 
state constitutions will be similarly interpreted.36  Some state constitutions 
appear to set a higher standard for public funds that aid religious 
institutions even indirectly. So far, however, cases making such claims 
have generally been decided on other grounds.37 
Charter schools, too, have been challenged on religious grounds.38  
One recent case considered whether the curriculum adopted by charter 
schools had improperly employed religious teachings. The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the claim, 
allowing it go forward.39  Since charter schools are public schools, the 
same rules regarding the teaching religious subjects apply to charter 
schools.40 That is, public school teachers may teach about religion, but 
may not teach religion per se.41 
Sometimes, however, the challenge is brought by parents wanting 
more, not less, religious instruction.  This type of litigation asserts that 
parents’ right to exercise their religion is unnecessarily abridged by 
various policy enactments.  For example, parents living in a Maine school 
district without a high school filed suit on the premise that limiting their 
publicly funded choices to public schools or non-sectarian private schools 
violated their right to freely exercise their religion as they wished their 
children to be educated in a religious school.  The Supreme Court of 
Maine rejected the claim, reasoning that while the parents preferred 
religious education, obtaining it was not central to the exercise of their 
beliefs.42 Accordingly, their rights to free exercise had not been violated. 
After the U.S. Supreme Court upheld vouchers in Zelman, some Maine 
parents renewed this objection in federal court.  However, the result was 
the same.43 The court relied on earlier decisions and the Supreme Court’s 
holding in a higher education case. That case, Locke v. Davey, determined 
that while religious choices could be made available without offending the 
Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause did not compel states to 
include religious options in the choice programs they developed.44 
 
Discrimination Cases 
Given the history of school choice and its connection to 
desegregation and the directive from Brown v. Board of Education,  it is a 
bit ironic to note that even school choice initiatives aimed at integrating 
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public schools frequently have had to be defended against claims of 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.45 As policymakers employed these 
programs as a means to voluntary integration, programs often used race-
conscious student selection processes. That is, students’ requests to 
transfer to a preferred school would be granted only if enrollment aided 
the district or school in creating integrated educational environments. Such 
systems necessarily resulted in some students being denied transfer 
requests on the same basis. These students and their parents have 
challenged such systems as violating the Equal Protection Clause.  
Such litigation recently culminated in the Supreme Court decision 
in Parents Involved In Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
Number 1.46 A narrow majority of the Court found unconstitutional the 
voluntary intradistrict choice programs implemented in Seattle and 
Louisville. However, no majority of justices agreed on both the holding 
and the legal reasoning. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito concluded that race would be a proper consideration 
for student enrollment only when plans are used to remedy judicial 
findings of state discrimination. Justice Kennedy, while agreeing that the 
Seattle and Louisville programs violated the Fourteenth Amendment, 
concluded that race-conscious objectives could be pursued as long as they 
did not result in a student being denied an admission request based on 
race.  Because this decision is so recent, policymakers have only begun to 
consider its implications for other choice programs that seek to attain 
racial diversity by persuading parents to enroll students in schools they 
might not have attended otherwise. 
 
Due Process 
As mentioned earlier, Pierce v. the Society of Sisters determined 
that Oregon had unreasonably limited parents’ rights to control the 
upbringing of their children by requiring attendance at public schools.  In 
constitutional terms, this conclusion is an example of a substantive due 
process violation. Substantive due process, guaranteed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is an issue of fundamental fairness.  Violations 
occur when government policymakers overreach their authority and deny 
a citizen or group of citizens liberty or property without adequate due 
process—that is, without adequate justification. All government policies 
and practices must, at a minimum, be rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest.  
Examples of substantive due process cases in relation to school 
choice are evident in home-schooling litigation. Some Arkansas parents, 
for example, attacked the state’s requirement that home-schooled students 
submit to achievement testing, arguing that it violated their right to control 
their child’s education.  The court disagreed, finding the requirement a 
reasonable restriction on home schooling.47  Likewise, a Maine court 
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upheld a state requirement that home schoolers submit their educational 
plan for approval.48 These two examples also illustrate how difficult 
substantive due process claims are to win.  Unless parents allege that the 
liberty denied is an explicit constitutional right (freedom of religion, for 
example), courts will usually apply only the lowest level of scrutiny and 
require only that the state behave reasonably.  Even when religious beliefs 
are involved in a case, courts sometimes rule against parents if they 
conclude that the state has sufficient justification for monitoring the 
educational practices of home schoolers.49 
Another due process argument that has been somewhat more 
successful relates to the vagueness of a state’s statutory language with 
respect to “private schools.”  For example, in Wisconsin v. Popanz, a 
father argued that his conviction for noncompliance with the compulsory 
education statute should be overturned because the state law at the time 
required only that a child attend a “public or private school.”  He argued 
that he satisfied the requirement by educating his children at home.  
Moreover, he claimed—and the court agreed—that the term “private 
school” was unconstitutionally vague, thus depriving him of due process.50  
 
Education Clause Cases 
Cases brought under the education clauses of state constitutions 
argue that school choice programs are invalid because they conflict with 
the specific educational mandate to the legislature with regard to public 
schools. For example, when charter schools were created in Michigan, a 
group of taxpayers filed suit, alleging that they were not sufficiently 
“public” to receive taxpayer funding under the Michigan constitution. The 
Michigan Supreme Court rejected this claim, finding that the state 
legislature had maintained sufficient state control over its charter schools 
to maintain consistency under the state’s Education Clause.51  To date, all 
challenges to charter school programs under state constitutions have been 
similarly rejected and all programs upheld. 
In contrast, the Florida Supreme Court recently struck down a 
voucher program as contrary to its constitution’s Education Clause. The 
program at issue, the Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP), allowed 
children who attended a public school deemed substandard to use the state 
monies to enroll in any private school, using funds that that otherwise 
would have gone to the substandard school. The Florida Supreme Court 
determined that the constitutional mandate to the legislature to create a 
“uniform” system of public education precluded the OSP because the state 
lacked the necessary control over the private schools. Moreover, the Court 
read the constitution as requiring that public education be provided solely 
through public schools.52   
Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court invalidated a voucher 
program as contrary to the state’s constitutional mandate that local school 
boards control publicly funded education. Since students taking advantage 
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of the Colorado Opportunity Contract Pilot Program would enroll in 
private schools at public expense, the program limited boards’ ability to 
control their funds, raised, at least in part, through local taxes.  The court 
concluded that the program directly violated the explicit local control 
requirement established in Article IX, Section 15 of the Colorado 
Constitution.53 
As these three examples illustrate, the precise wording of an 
individual state’s constitutional provision regarding education may permit 
some choice programs prohibited in other states. Likewise, within an 
individual state, some forms of choice may be held to be consistent with 
the state constitution’s education clause, while other forms of choice may 
not.  
 
Special Education Cases 
School choice litigation has also addressed the questions of 
whether and how special education requirements apply when parents may 
select their child’s school. At issue are two concepts protected under 
federal disability law: access and appropriate programming. Access is the 
concept that publicly funded benefits ought to be provided without 
discrimination on the basis of disability, as required under Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504) and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA). Accordingly, when policy-makers make school 
choice available to parents and students, they must ensure that children 
with disabilities and their parents are eligible to participate.  Once access 
is provided, consideration must be given to the kinds of services necessary 
to make the access meaningful. 
Access to voucher programs for children with disabilities has 
generated only limited litigation. In fact, the only decision on the issue is a 
trial court opinion on a challenge to the original version of the Milwaukee 
Parental Choice Program. In that decision, the judge determined that 
participating private schools needed only to accept children with 
disabilities to the same extent required of nonparticipating private schools. 
This ruling meant that participating schools had to accept voucher students 
with disabilities unless doing so would require them to substantially alter 
their educational program. The court determined that since the schools 
were not required to provide special education and related services, they 
could not be required to comply with the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA).54  
Access to and programming in other publicly funded choice 
options has also sparked legal challenge, but most often in the form of 
administrative challenges and policy letters.55 The combined lessons from 
these challenges can be expressed in four reasonably clear directives: 
 
1. All publicly funded choice programs must be accessible to 
children with disabilities.56 
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2. Parents and children can not be required to waive needed 
services in order to participate in the choice program.57 
3. A student’s right to “free appropriate public education” must 
be preserved in any choice program delivered in public 
schools.58 
4. States need to determine which entity (the sending district, 
receiving school or district, a combination, or some other 
entity) will serve as the responsible “local education agency” 
for purposes of IDEA.59 
 
Even when a program complies with these requirements, school 
choice clearly complicates the application of special education law. 
Numerous authors have commented on the tension between allowing 
parents to select a school and the strict IDEA requirement that all 
placement decisions be made by a team of persons knowledgeable about 
the child’s abilities and needs.60  What happens if parents “choose” a 
program that the team considers inappropriate?  How must school 
authorities reconcile choice and appropriateness under the IDEA? 
The answer to these questions under current law appears to be that 
parents may choose, so long as their choices are consistent with the 
concept of a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) as guaranteed by 
both IDEA and Section 504. Choice programs, therefore, must consider 
how to provide the necessary services in order to make FAPE available.61 
 
Statutory Construction Cases 
Finally, a review of school choice litigation must include cases 
involving statutory issues.  Such cases require courts to determine whether 
a particular program is consistent with existing laws or how a particular 
provision should apply in a particular instance. 
The latter type of case is exemplified in judicial review of charter 
denials, revocations, or non-renewals. Because some charter statutes 
explicitly allow for judicial appeals of charter school denials,62 
disappointed charter school aspirants have often used this option to force 
authorizers to reconsider their application.63  
In addition to such review of authorization decisions, other cases 
may allege that a particular choice option is invalid given existing 
statutory requirements. For example, when a school district in Wisconsin 
created a cyber charter school and allowed students living outside of the 
district to enroll via statewide open enrollment, challengers raised three 
statutory issues: (1) that the school was not located within school district 
boundaries as required by the state’s charter school law; (2) that since 
some of the students never attend a school physically located within 
district boundaries, payments from resident school districts to the district 
operating the cyber charter school violated the state’s open enrollment 
statute; and (3) that since parents assume the primary instructional role, 
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the school violated statutory requirements that only licensed teachers teach 
in public schools. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found merit in each 
claim and determined that the challengers were entitled to summary 
judgment on each allegation.64  In clarifying its ruling, the court explained: 
 
We express no opinion on the merit of [the cyber charter 
school’s] educational model, or on the relative 
competencies of licensed teachers and dedicated parents to 
recognize and make the most of “teachable moments.” [The 
cyber charter school] may be, as its proponents claim, a 
godsend for children who would not succeed in more 
traditional public schools, as well as a welcome new option 
for parents who want their children to receive a home-
based education for any number of reasons. But it is also a 
public school operated with state funds, and its operation 
violates the statutes as they now stand. It is for the citizens 
of this state, through their elected representatives in the 
legislature, to decide whether and how their tax money is 
going to be spent. If the citizenry wants tax money spent on 
virtual schools like [the challenged school], that is fine. Let 
the citizens debate it and set the parameters, not the 
courts.65 
 
As this quotation makes clear, courts are limited to applying 
existing statutes. As more innovations occur, whether through school 
choice or not, they must comply with existing statutory frameworks or risk 
litigation to force such compliance. Alternatively, those statutes must be 
revised to allow for new conceptions of education and choice. 
Table 2, following, provides a summary of the types of litigation 
filed with respect to each type of school choice.  
It is interesting to note that voucher programs and charter school 
programs have prompted the broadest array of legal challenges. As both 
vouchers and charters arguably best illustrate Friedman’s competition 
model, it is not surprising that they would encounter the most litigation. It 
is equally unsurprising that home schooling has faced the fewest legal 
challenges, since it is an exit from public funding.  
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Table 2:  Issues Raised in Litigation of School Choice Options 
 Religion 
 Clauses 
Discrimination Due 
 Process 
Education 
 Clause 
Special 
Education 
Statutory 
Issues 
Charter 
Schools 
9 9  9 9 9
Cyber 
Schools 
    9 9
Home- 
schooling 
9  9   9
Interdistrict Choice 
- City-
Suburban 
Plans 
 9     
- Statewide 
Open 
Enrollment 
 9   9  
Intradistrict Choice 
   -Magnet  
   Schools 
 9   9  
-Intra-
district 
transfer 
 9   9  
Vouchers 9 9  9 9 9
 
 
Recent Developments 
As this discussion illustrates, both legislation and litigation have 
played and continue to play an important role in shaping school choice. 
Three recent developments in the relationship between law and school 
choice deserve further discussion: the expansion of charter schools, 
NCLB’s choice provisions, and the recent Supreme Court decision 
regarding voluntary integration programs. 
 
The Expansion of Charter Schools 
Charter schools first appeared in Minnesota in 1990. By 2003, the 
number of states allowing charter schools had increased to 40, with 
approximately 2,700 schools serving 684,000 students.66  Current 
estimates put the numbers at more than 4,000 charter schools serving more 
than a million students.67  By any measure, these figures show that charter 
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schools have become a feature of many states’ public educational systems. 
Given the fact that charter schools have enjoyed broad bipartisan 
support,68 including federal funding through the Charter Schools 
Expansion Act, it is not surprising that their number and influence have 
increased since their introduction a decade and a half ago. 
The growth of charter schools has been accompanied by the 
evolution of charter school laws. Charters were established, at least in part, 
as a way to introduce market-driven education in a public-only context.69  
In return for some freedom from traditional regulation through state 
statutes and administrative codes, charter schools agree to accountability 
through performance contracts and parental choice. States have 
periodically examined this tradeoff to determine whether charter schools 
are both sufficiently autonomous and sufficiently accountable. In some 
instances, states have made statutory schemes more permissive by 
allowing new entities to authorize charters and by further relaxing other 
state controls. In other cases, states have increased their regulatory hold on 
charter schools by adopting more stringent standards for adoption, 
operation, renewal, and revocation.70  Charter school proponents refer to 
such tightening of state control as “regulatory creep,” a phenomenon they 
believe should be avoided.71  However their actions are viewed, state 
policymakers clearly remain involved in determining how to fit charter 
schools into the public school system. 
 
NCLB’s Choice Provisions 
A second recent and notable development involves the choice 
provisions codified as part of the No Child Left Behind Act.  Congress is 
currently in the process of reauthorizing NCLB and therefore its members 
are examining the law’s merits and shortcomings as they determine 
whether and how to revise its existing provisions. As matters currently 
stand, however, school choice is an integral part of NCLB.  When the law 
was enacted, the U.S. Department of Education named four “pillars” as its 
foundation, one of which was “more choices for parents.”72  This “pillar” 
led to several school choice provisions—perhaps most notably as part of 
NCLB’s accountability system, which imposes choice as a penalty for 
schools not making “adequate yearly progress” for two consecutive years. 
“Adequate yearly progress” (AYP) refers to a school’s incremental 
progress toward NCLB’s mandated goal of having 100% of students score 
at or above proficiency standards on state assessments in reading, math, 
and science by 2014. Students must be tested annually in grades 3-8 and 
once during grades 9-12. While states set the curricular standards and 
develop the assessments, both must be approved by the United States 
Department of Education. States also set progressively more stringent 
goals for schools each year (the annual AYP) as they target 100% 
proficiency in each subject. 
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Schools must annually report test scores to the public, including a 
comparison of scores disaggregated by race, socioeconomic status, gender, 
language, and disability. A school could be declared “in need of 
improvement” if it tests less than 95% of its student population or if too 
few students meet proficiency standards set for each assessment. 
Moreover, all goals must be met, not only for the student population as a 
whole, but also for each disaggregated group. For example, a school could 
be declared “in need of improvement” because only 90% of students 
learning English took the state’s assessment.  Likewise, if test scores 
revealed that all groups except children with disabilities had met the 
proficiency standards, the school would be deemed “in need of 
improvement” and the accountability provisions would apply. 73  
Penalties for failure to meet AYP are substantive.  Schools 
designated “in need of improvement” for two or more consecutive years 
are subject to NCLB’s choice provisions. Schools in such circumstances 
must notify parents of the situation and allow student transfers to other 
public schools that have met AYP. In addition, schools must set aside a 
portion of the funds received under NCLB to cover transportation costs for 
the students. If a school does not test enough students or student test 
scores do not demonstrate sufficient progress for a third consecutive year, 
NCLB funds must be made available to parents to allow them to purchase 
supplemental educational services (tutoring). When a school fails the 
standards for a fourth year, the district must take corrective action; if 
failure persists into a fifth consecutive year, the district must restructure 
the school. Restructuring may include converting the school to a charter 
school, if it is not one already. Moreover, the penalties are cumulative. 
That is, parents with children entitled to supplemental educational services 
are also entitled to transfer to a school of their choice. In addition, if an 
entire school district is declared “in need of improvement” under NCLB 
for a fourth consecutive year, the state must take corrective action, with 
one suggested alternative being to permit students to transfer to another 
school district. Finally, parents with children enrolled in schools deemed 
“persistently dangerous” must be given the option to choose another 
school regardless of how well or poorly students perform academically in 
the dangerous school.74 
These NCLB provisions are significant as they represent the first 
federalized school choice program. They were controversial at the time of 
adoption and remain controversial now.75  In fact, President Bush first 
argued for NCLB to include private as well as public school choice.76  
Under the bill he originally proposed, parents would have been given a 
voucher to attend any public or private school whenever a public school 
failed to perform at the required standard. Although private school choice 
did not survive the political process,77 the fact that Congress embraced any 
form of school choice as means to school reform marks an important 
advancement of Friedman’s market-based conception of school 
accountability. Whether current choice provisions will remain when 
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NCLB is reauthorized sometime in 2008 or 2009 will reveal much about 
the country’s commitment to and confidence in school choice as a tool to 
leverage educational improvement. 
 
The Impact of Parents Involved 
Finally, as noted above, the Supreme Court’s decision in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District Number 1 will 
likely have significant impact on school officials’ efforts to integrate 
student populations through controlled parental choice programs. Chief 
Justice Roberts concluded simply that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on 
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” And yet, it 
is clear that the tie between race and opportunity has not yet been broken. 
Indeed, research documents the resegregation of America’s schools along 
racial lines, with many more schools now more racially isolated than they 
were even a decade ago.78 While Justice Kennedy’s opinion holds out 
hope that policymakers may still pursue integrated education as a goal, the 
decision in Parents Involved severely restricts current efforts to do so. 
Literally hundreds of programs exist across the country that use parental 
choice as an inducement to integrate. Those plans must now all be 
reviewed to determine whether they might similarly be considered in 
violation of the Constitution. Further litigation examining boundaries of 
those programs seems inevitable. 
Many consider the decision in Parents Involved to be a dramatic 
shift away from the promise of integrated education and equal educational 
opportunity espoused by Brown. Justice Breyer’s dissent forcefully made 
this point when he concluded: 
 
Finally, what of the hope and promise of Brown? For much 
of this Nation’s history, the races remained divided. It was 
not long ago that people of different races drank from 
separate fountains, rode on separate buses, and studied in 
separate schools. In this Court’s finest hour, Brown v. 
Board of Education challenged this history and helped to 
change it. For Brown held out a promise. It was a promise 
embodied in three Amendments designed to make citizens 
of slaves. It was the promise of true racial equality—not as 
a matter of fine words on paper, but as a matter of everyday 
life in the Nation’s cities and schools. It was about the 
nature of a democracy that must work for all Americans. It 
sought one law, one Nation, one people, not simply as a 
matter of legal principle but in terms of how we actually 
live. . . . The last half-century has witnessed great strides 
toward racial equality, but we have not yet realized the 
promise of Brown. To invalidate the plans under review is 
to threaten the promise of Brown. The plurality’s position, I 
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fear, would break that promise. This is a decision that the 
Court and the Nation will come to regret.79 
 
Justice Breyer’s comment recognizes that the Court’s decision will 
require any school choice program that includes race-conscious provisions 
to determine whether its criteria are allowed.  Programs similar to those in 
Seattle and Louisville are no longer permissible as a means to integrate 
public schools.   
How then may integration be accomplished? Many consider 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence to be the roadmap for such an 
examination.  Clearly Justice Kennedy wrestled with the issues laid bare 
by Parents Involved80 and worried about the effects the decision would 
have on the racial composition of public schools.  While ultimately 
invalidating the Seattle and Louisville choice programs and what he 
characterized as “crude” systems of classifying individual students by 
race,81 he expressed the view that “[t]his Nation has a moral and ethical 
obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated 
society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children.”82 He listed 
six methods by which he believed such a goal could be accomplished 
consistent with the constitution: (a)“strategic site selection of new 
schools;” (b) “drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the 
demographics of neighborhoods;” (c) “allocating resources for special 
programs;” (d) “recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion;” (e) 
“tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race”;83 and (f) 
“if necessary, a more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and 
student characteristics that might include race as a component.”84  
It remains to be seen whether this decision will curtail parental 
choice programs in the locales they now operate. Justice Kennedy does not 
explicitly name parental choice as one of the six factors, though the first 
(strategic site selection), the fourth (recruiting students and faculty), and 
the last (an individual examination of student characteristics including 
race as one factor among many) may be related to various choice 
initiatives.  However, the Court’s decision could cause officials to 
dismantle existing race-conscious choice programs in order to avoid 
litigation on the issue.  Alternatively, they may simply continue to allow 
parental choices without regard to impact on the racial composition of 
student populations.  What is inescapable, however, is that the decision in 
Parents Involved requires such an examination of each program to 
determine whether it aligns with guidelines the ruling provides.  More 
litigation on the relationship of race and choice is likely as policy-makers 
grapple with the application of Parents Involved. 
 
Discussion 
As this examination illustrates, law shapes school choice in 
tangible and unmistakable ways. The work of legislators at federal, state 
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and local levels defines and funds various choice options. The work of 
jurists and litigators considers whether those initiatives and their 
implementation are lawful. Whether through legislation or litigation, 
sources of law continually re-examine the balance struck between parens 
patriae—the state’s interest in compelling and controlling education—and 
parents’ individual liberty to make decisions for themselves and their 
children. 
Of course, school choice is not limited to the United States, but 
also has a place in other countries’ educational systems.  David Plank and 
Gary Sykes report that school choice is gaining in popularity and operates 
to some extent in a number of countries including England, Chile, South 
Africa, the Czech Republic, China, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Sweden.85 In fact, while not specifying school choice as it has come to be 
defined in the United States, the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights asserts that “[p]arents have a prior right to choose the kind 
of education that shall be given to their children.”86  Of course, the 
particular contours of the choices available to parents in any country 
depend on the laws binding them. 
It is therefore fitting to emphasize the fact that law not only defines 
and constrains parental choices, it is also a codification of collective 
values.  With the input of their constituents, politicians and other 
policymakers debate the wisdom and effectiveness of various programs. 
Eventually decision makers ratify any compromises by making formal 
policy pronouncements. Each provision reflects the collective will and 
principles that survived the democratic, decision-making process. Even 
decisions about funding speak to what a body politic most values.  
What values, then, do choice programs espouse?  That question is 
at the heart of the debate surrounding school choice. The answer depends 
on the type of choice, its breadth, and the details of its operation. Does 
choice serve as an instrument to another deeply held commitment such as 
diversity or opportunity, or is choice itself the value?  Will school choice 
help the collective achieve the vision desired, or will it undercut the very 
values it intends to promote? If parental choice results in racially 
homogeneous schools, does that comport with or debase the concept of 
“public” schools?  Likewise, if parents select a school or a curriculum that 
emphasizes science but omits art, are the children being sufficiently 
“educated” for the public? If parents have the predominant voice in 
educational policies through school selection and control of educational 
funds, how do schools then serve the childless portions of the electorate?  
Do schools serve only parents and children, or do they serve communities?  
These debates have long swirled around conceptions of parental choice.87 
As such debates continue, whether in the form of reviewing current 
choice initiatives or considering the development of new forms of choice, 
law will play an inevitable role.  This conclusion is unavoidable simply 
because law reflects the democratic processes created by the body politic.  
The creation and review of policy in the form of “law” is the means by 
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which we collectively consider the relationship between the citizen and the 
state, between private choices and the public good.  As Tyack and Cuban 
explain: 
 
In continuing the tradition of trusteeship of the public good, 
this engaged debate about the shape of the future, all 
citizens have a stake, not only the students who temporarily 
attend school or their parents. And this is the main reason 
that Americans long ago created and have continually 
sought to reform public education.88 
 
Legislation and litigation are the products of our public struggle 
concerning the role of public education in a democratic society. Since the 
nation’s founding, many have considered and continue to consider public 
education a necessary predicate for democracy to function.89 That 
realization suggests that parents’ choices will likely always be constrained 
by some measure of state control, maintaining the constant tension 
identified earlier between parens patriae and parents’ rights to direct their 
children’s education. How robust either principle is in relation to the other 
will depend on how particular forms of choice strike a balance between 
them. Legislation will continue to codify those balances and other choice 
arrangements, and litigation will continue to probe their consistency with 
existing constitutional and statutory requirements. The legislative and 
judicial activities reviewed here—in  particular the three recent 
developments of charter school expansion, the advent and reauthorization 
of NCLB, and recent Supreme Court decision curtailing the use of race in 
the Seattle and Louisville choice programs—demonstrate that the balance 
between parens patiae and parents’ rights is in constant flux.  Legislation 
and litigation are two tools that capture the status of that equilibrium at 
any given moment in time.   
 
Recommendations 
As policymakers undertake the daunting task of defining public 
education for current and future generations, it is likely that school choice 
will continue to play some role. Accordingly, the following 
recommendations are offered to officials to guide their work as they 
consider the implications of the choice initiatives established, the purposes 
they intend to serve, and the civic principles embedded by their adoption. 
 
• Examine parental choice programs to ensure that they espouse the 
values of the communities they serve in a manner consistent with 
federal and state constitutional guarantees. 
• Ensure that parental choice programs serve educational opportunity and 
equity rather than undercut them. 
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• Consider carefully the implications of any choice program, not only for 
those who “choose” but also for those who do not. 
• Engage the research community not only to inform the debate about 
effectiveness of various options, but also to track the implications of 
the various choice programs undertaken. 
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